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Abstract
Municipal bylaws are routinely contested in court on the grounds that they are “ultra vires” or beyond the legal 
authority of the municipality. Many of these challenges allege that the municipal exercise of power infringes on 
federal or provincial powers as assigned by ss. 91 and 92 of the British North America Act, 1867.  Th ese confl icts 
have not been systematically studied and we address this lacuna by surveying the reported cases of municipal-
federal and municipal-provincial confl icts in the LawSource database of Canadian judgments.  Our preliminary 
fi nding—that challenges on federal grounds are much more likely to succeed than those on provincial grounds— 
requires an explanation.  After factoring some disparities in the case sets (including a disproportionate number 
of zoning cases in the provincial context), we argue that the persistent diff erence in win-rates is due to a greater 
acceptance of municipal autonomy in the provincial context (despite their origins as “creatures of the province,” a 
number of provincial statutes have granted broad authority to many municipalities) whereas the federal confl icts 
run more clearly against constitutionally-defi ned interests.  We conclude by considering this asymmetry and its 
signifi cance for Canadian multi-level governance.
Keywords: ultra vires, municipal law, Constitution Act 1867, division of powers, federalism
Résumé
Les règlements municipaux sont contestés régulièrement en cour sur la base qu’ils sont «ultra vires» ou en 
dehors des compétences de la municipalité. Plusieurs de ces contestations allèguent que les municipalités 
exercent un pouvoir qui porte atteinte aux pouvoirs provinciaux ou fédéraux, d’après les articles 91 et 92 de 
la Loi Constitutionelle de 1867. Ces confl its n’ont jamais été étudiés systématiquement, et donc nous adressons 
cette lacune en surveillant les cas de confl its municipaux-fédéraux et municipales-provinciales dans les bases 
de données «LawSource» de jugements canadiens. Nos résultats primaires—que les contestations sur des bases 
fédérales sont plus probables à réussir que ceux sur des bases provincials—nécessitent une explication. Après 
avoir considéré certaines disparités dans les arrêts (incluant un nombre disproportionné d’arrêt de zonage dans 
le contexte provincial), nous argumentons que la plus grande diff érence des rates «gagnantes» est à cause d’une 
acceptation plus générale de l’autonomie municipale dans le contexte provincial (malgré le fait que leur origine 
est une «créature de la province,» il y a un grand nombre de statues provinciales qui accordent des pouvoirs 
aux municipalités) tandis que les confl its fédéraux sont plus clairement contre des intérêts constitutionnels. 
Nous concluons en considérant cette asymétrie et sa signifi cation pour les multiples niveaux de gérance de la 
gouvernance multi-niveaux.
Mots clés: ultra vires, droit municipal, Loi Constitutionelle de 1867, partage des pouvoirs, fédéralisme  
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As the level of government closest to its citizens, municipalities off er both the prospect of accessibility and 
the problem of overregulation. Th eir responsiveness is likely to draw them into all matters of concern and, while 
most of their attention will be drawn to local issues, municipal governments are inevitably going to be called 
upon to address matters beyond their jurisdiction. In some cases they will answer that call and, by accident or 
design, they will intrude upon powers that are properly assigned to other levels of government. Jurisdictional 
overreach need not be nefarious and, indeed, it may be the only means to address matters of true local concern: 
the recent battle between Hamilton and Canada Post over the placement of community mailboxes is illustrative 
(Mehta 2015). Responding to complaints about the placement in terms of litter, safety and traffi  c when the 
boxes are placed in “less-than-ideal locations,” Hamilton passed a bylaw that requires Canada Post to fi rst 
obtain a permit, allowing Hamilton offi  cials to evaluate the Crown Corporation’s choices. In doing so, they are 
directly challenging a federal law—the Canada Post Corporation Act1 grants the power to expropriate property 
for the purposes of mail delivery—that is squarely within the federal government’s constitutional jurisdiction.2 
By using their power to regulate local matters even when it confl icts with the jurisdiction of the other level, 
Hamilton began what we refer to as a “bylaw battle.” 
Perhaps needless to say, such bylaw battles often end up in court (and, indeed, the City of Hamilton soon 
found itself in court over the bylaw). Th e litany of cases where a municipality’s jurisdictional authority has 
been challenged in court and resolved through judicial review is the subject of this study. We contend that 
these “bylaw battles” reveal much about the constitutional status and power of municipalities in Canada. Th ey 
demonstrate the relationships between the three levels of government and help assess the relative autonomy of 
municipalities. By simply looking at win-rates for bylaws against claims of provincial and federal jurisdiction, 
a key insight can be demonstrated: municipal bylaws are much more likely to withstand a challenge when the 
claim is based on alleged provincial jurisdiction than alleged federal jurisdiction. Our research suggests that 
Hamilton was less likely to succeed in its actions against Canada Post than it would against a provincial claim 
of jurisdiction (and, indeed, their bylaw was found ultra vires for intruding on federal jurisdiction,3 as predicted 
in earlier drafts of this article). More importantly, a closer and more detailed examination of this case set can 
lead to a better understanding of inter-level jurisdictional confl ict and a more robust account of what quasi-
constitutional powers municipalities can exercise in formal and practical terms.  
I. Th e Ambivalent Constitutional Position of Municipalities
While there is an abundance of literature on both the Canadian division of powers and municipalities, these 
two subject areas are rarely examined in tandem. Th is is probably a refl ection of the municipalities’ low standing 
in formal constitutional schema. In fact, in the Constitution Act, 1867, the word “municipal” appears only twice 
and, in both cases, grants the provincial government exclusive legislative authority. Section 92(8) provides a 
general provincial power over “municipal institutions in the province” and section 92(9) allows for the province 
to grant licencing powers to supplement provincial, local or municipal revenue. In addition, section 92 also 
provides the provinces with the power over “Property and Civil Rights in the Province” (13) and authority 
“generally” over “all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province” (16), which essentially places all 
potential municipal power within the provincial sphere. As MacLean and Tomlinson observe, “[t]he existence 
and powers of the municipal government, the ‘lowest level’ of government, depend entirely on the province, the 
‘middle level’ of government (2008, 1). Indeed, some have mused that a provincial government could abolish 
or amalgamate all local governments within its borders, at least in theory (Lightbody 2006, 40). As corporate 
entities in law, municipalities do not act on behalf of the Monarch and—unlike the federal and provincial 
governments—they are therefore not considered “sovereign” (Sancton 2011, 262). In formal constitutional 
terms, municipalities are considered nothing more than “mere creatures of the province” and thus, from a 
strict division of powers standpoint, not a primary subject of study and arguably only of interest as an indirect 
expression of provincial power. 
Th is narrow, formalistic view runs directly counter to the reality of the important role that municipalities 
play in Canadian governance. Th eir roles can vary considerably across provinces: for instance, Ontario is the 
only province where municipalities have the requirement to provide social services and help fund them (Sancton 
2009, 4). However, across all provinces, municipalities have some authority for the following areas: fi re protection, 
animal control, traffi  c control, waste-collection, land-use planning, economic development, public libraries, parks 
and recreation, economic development, licencing of businesses, emergency planning and preparedness, rural 
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fences, drainage, regulation of ceremonies, and more (ibid.). Urban municipalities generally possess even more 
powers, like sewage collection, public transit, and water purifi cation. However, there is signifi cant diff erence in 
municipal responsibilities between provinces, which interrupts “the cultural continuities within the national 
borders” (Garber and Imbroscio 1996, 603). As Andrew Sancton notes, for larger provinces, it is diffi  cult to 
imagine a legislative scheme without a local government; it would be bureaucratically infeasible for a province to 
make decisions about all matters within its sphere of jurisdiction (2011, 22). Moreover, the constitutional oddity 
is further demonstrated by contrasting the City of Toronto with the Province of Prince Edward Island (PEI). 
PEI contains approximately 140,000 people, while Toronto contains approximately 2.5 million and the Greater 
Toronto Area approximately 6.1 million. PEI is constitutionally protected as a province and wields infl uence 
disproportionate to its population, while Toronto is granted no constitutional authority. Th is is obviously an 
irritant for large municipal governments like Toronto, where some form of constitutional power might assist in 
performing their duties or helping them negotiate with the other levels of government (Smith 2010, 19).  
 Th e legal resolution to the constitutional disconnect between theory and practice is obvious: delegation. In 
the past, ‘Dillon’s Rule’ of delegation was invoked to deal with the powers and limitations of municipal authority. 
Th is approach required municipal bylaws to be founded on expressly delegated power and strictly limited the 
reach of these powers to the extent of the delegation (Hoehn 1996, 1). Th is approach is also known as the 
“laundry list:” if there is no express legal authority for an action, municipalities typically could not legislate in that 
area (Tindal et al. 2013, 201). Municipal power was therefore explicitly and completely dependent on provincial 
delegation: what power they had, they borrowed. 
In Canada, the Supreme Court has generally moved away from Dillon’s Rule towards what the Court calls 
a “benevolent construction” or “broad and purposive approach” of municipal powers, aff ording considerable 
deference to municipal decisions.4 Th e laundry list approach has been eschewed in favour of a broader 
interpretation of any delegation, according to Supreme Court rulings such as Spraytech and United Taxi Drivers’ 
Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary (Tindal et al. 2013, 217). In the Supreme Court’s Spraytech decision, 
the right of local governments to take proactive measures to stop environmental harm was upheld despite the 
federal and provincial jurisdiction over environmental matters (McAllister 2004, 122-123). Hoehn (1996, 2-3) 
argues that broad grants are “rarely eff ective in conferring jurisdiction,” but the Court’s more recent decisions 
have put this assessment in question. Kong suggests as much, arguing that the Supreme Court “has taken a 
generally deferential view of municipalities’ interpretations of their own powers” on the grounds that they have 
a more sound decision-making capacity than the judiciary (Kong 2010, 518). Coincident with this judicial 
move towards a more generous construction, some provinces (B.C., Alberta and Ontario) have, to varying 
extents, moved away from “laundry list” legislation towards more general powers for municipalities, in eff ect 
discouraging the courts from invalidating laws on a narrow interpretation of what has been delegated. Even in 
the largely deferential Spraytech decision, however, there are limits to the Court’s generous view of municipal 
power: it remains the judicial prerogative to analyze the true purpose of bylaws to ensure they conform to the 
“general welfare” purposes of the broad grant (ibid., 519). Magnusson (2005b, 907) argues that even broad grants 
of general authority can be interpreted restrictively by courts for fear of reading in authority that legislatures did 
not intend municipalities to have. 
 Th ere are signs that municipalities are seizing the opportunity to advance their constitutional status. 
Some municipalities have attempted to pass their own local “constitutions”: Rossland and Pitt Meadows, two 
municipalities in British Columbia, have “entrenched” their powers despite a lack of provincial legal authority 
to do so (McAllister 2004, 249). In addition, aggressive councils and mayors have challenged their weak formal 
constitutional status. Th e infl uential role of the City of Vancouver in the creation of the Vancouver Area 
Network of Drug Users (VANDU) and its success in maintaining the Insite safe injection clinic is an example 
of how municipalities are increasingly important actors in the delivery of public health and safety services 
(Tindal et al. 2013, 202; Smith and Stewart 2006, 259-265). Despite pushback from the federal government and 
encroachment with a criminal law matter, the Supreme Court maintained the clinic’s status, as the municipality 
preferred.5 Another example consistent with this view of informal strength is the major role played by the City 
of Windsor in infl uencing decisions regarding the Detroit River border crossing (Sutcliff e 2012, 153). 
Cities are currently vulnerable to “arbitrary statutory change that undermines their fragile autonomy” 
(Sancton 2002, 274). However, Sancton (2011, 28) argues that s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which allows 
religious minorities in certain provinces to elect their own school boards, is a form of constitutional protection. 
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Magnusson proposes a similar, albeit more radical, argument. He challenges the idea that municipalities are 
creatures of the provinces and suggests an interpretation consistent with the “the principles of a free and 
democratic society” (Magnusson 2005a, 6). If the Constitution is to be interpreted as a living document in a 
liberal-democratic society, Magnusson suggests that the power over “municipal institutions” should be interpreted 
as a protective clause, rather than one granting absolute control to the provinces. Neither the provinces nor the 
federal government should have the right to “sweep away” such fundamental institutions (ibid., 10).
We suggest that a robust appraisal of the constitutional status of municipalities requires an appreciation of 
both their formal and informal strength. Th e importance of informal strength is discussed by Asare et al. (2009, 
84): “Th e blurring of formal and informal sources of authority is extended to the roles of government actors 
at various levels, with informal infl uence often more relevant than formal jurisdictions” [emphasis added]. A 
better assessment of the place of municipalities in Canada’s constitutional order requires further investigation of 
municipal authority and power using a relational analysis that compares municipal with federal and provincial 
jurisdiction where they are in clear confl ict. 
2. Bylaw Battles: Jurisdictional Confl icts With Other Levels of Government
Magnusson (2005b, 907) argues that Canadian municipalities are timid creatures, unwilling to legislate outside 
of their jurisdiction in fear of lawsuits. He argues that this has been exacerbated by restrictive readings of the 
ultra vires rule: 
[M]unicipalities often struggle to fi nd authority to do new things, and are frequently cautioned 
by their solicitors not to go too far […] Timidity reigns, because municipalities are in a grey 
zone between the sovereign authority of the state and the free activity of civil society. (ibid.) 
However, more recent articles by current municipal solicitors suggest otherwise, that challenging a bylaw is 
actually quite diffi  cult. Malik et al. (2014, 4) argue that “[i]t should come as no surprise that in keeping with the 
modern judicial treatment regarding the interpretation of municipal powers, few challenges to the exercise of a 
municipality’s jurisdiction to enact a bylaw ever succeed.” With an emphasis on the purpose of a law for the ultra 
vires analysis, and given the broad range of permissible municipal objectives, “it can be extremely diffi  cult for a 
challenger of a bylaw to identify what the overriding or dominant purpose for enacting the bylaw might have 
been” and “[c]onversely, it will be relatively easy for a municipality to establish that at least one of the reasons for 
enacting a bylaw falls within its jurisdiction” (ibid.). Th ese competing assessments of the diffi  culty for ensuring 
constitutional compliance are an invitation for further empirical study. To our knowledge, no systematic studies 
of the Canadian judicial review of bylaws have been conducted.
In order to better assess the constitutional power of municipalities, one can look to the jurisprudence on 
municipal confl icts. In addition to the descriptive value of the overall number of cases, it is also possible to 
examine the success rate of federal versus provincial ultra vires challenges to municipal bylaws. Judicial “win 
rates” have been studied to determine the level of success governments have had in litigating Charter challenges 
(McCormick 1993; Choudhry and Hunter 2003) and they have been used to assess the strength of interest 
groups in shaping public policy through law (Morton and Allen 2001). To be sure, a simple win rate is a blunt 
measure and a more sophisticated analysis would consider whether the government actor was a complainant or 
respondent, the eff ect of repeat players and whether the action was “defensive” or “off ensive.” Th ese are important 
considerations, especially since these challenges are often brought by third-parties (i.e., not the government 
whose jurisdiction is asserted), but the limited data available for municipal jurisdictional confl ict cases only 
allow for a more general analysis to be made presently. Morton et al. are right that “the reasons given to justify a 
decision are often more important in the long run than a decision’s basic outcome or ‘bottom line’” (Morton et 
al. 1995, 2) but we believe that the outcomes captured in the win rates, especially when placed in a comparative 
context, can tell us something about the relative power of municipalities before the bench.
For the purposes of this study, we consider a “win” to be from the perspective of the municipal bylaw (“win” 
means the bylaw survives the challenge and “loss” means the bylaw is stuck down as ultra vires); no normative 
assessments about the merits of the bylaw or the resolution of the jurisdictional questions are intended. To 
develop a case set, we used the Canadian Abridgement Digests, accessible through WestLaw and LawSource, to 
identify cases where a litigant claims a municipal bylaw is ultra vires. To succeed with such a claim, the litigant 
would have to prove that jurisdiction properly belonged to either the federal or provincial legislature.6 Th e 
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Digests contain an extensive variety of ultra vires categories7 and some of these categories have been specifi cally 
excluded for the purposes of this study.8 Since this study seeks only to determine the confl ict of municipal 
bylaws, all categories relating to contracts and expenditures have been excluded because they typically raise 
complex collateral issues that are beyond the scope of this study. Th e remaining categories included all of those 
where bylaws were challenged on the grounds of being ultra vires. Th e study examines only those cases that were 
decided in or after 1993. Tribunal decisions, like those of the Ontario Municipal Board, are likewise omitted. In 
cases that have been appealed, only the highest appellate decision is considered.9
Table 1. Federal and Provincial Win Rates for Municipalities
Result Level of Confl ict
Federal Provincial Both Total
Struck 14 (51.9%) 56 (31.6%) 1 (20.0%) 71 (34.0%)
Upheld 13 (48.1% 121 (68.4%) 4 (80.0%) 138 (66.0%)
            
In total, after 29 exclusions on the basis of the above criteria, the data set consisted of 209 cases. Th ree 
observations about these 209 cases are easily made: (1) it is diffi  cult to invalidate a municipal bylaw on ultra vires 
grounds, with two-thirds (138, 66%) of the impugned bylaws upheld against the challenge; (2) jurisdictional 
claims against municipal bylaws are more likely to be alleged as an intrusion on provincial (177) rather than 
federal jurisdiction (27);10 and (3) the win-rates are considerably diff erent, with a little under a half of the federal 
confl ict cases surviving the challenge (13/27, 48.1%) and over two-thirds (121/177; 68.4%) of the provincial 
cases surviving. Th e fi rst observation addresses the competing claims of Magnusson (2005b) and Malick et 
al. (2014) regarding the diffi  culty of challenging a bylaw on ultra vires grounds: it is diffi  cult for complaints 
to succeed (losing two-thirds of the time) but even a one-third invalidation rate might make municipalities 
overly cautious about their jurisdictional authority.  We leave the normative issue about the “appropriate” level 
of jurisdictional deference to others.  While the overall statistics—with a sample size of 209—are reliable, the 
small number of federal-municipal cases (27) makes any generalizable observations regarding federal versus 
provincial rates diffi  cult. Given that we have used all available reported cases in the Abridgement, in statistical 
terms “the entire population,” the limitation of the size of the data set is unavoidable.  While this precludes a 
rigorous quantitative assessment (with statistically signifi cant fi ndings) and makes many statistical tools (which 
tell us whether the sample is representative of the whole) immaterial, we believe the frequencies observed 
are suggestive and worthy of discussion.  Moreover, a qualitative look at those cases generates some tentative 
insights into the nature and resolution of the municipal-provincial and municipal-federal confl icts.
3. Explaining Frequencies and Win-Rate Disparities  
A simple explanation of the disparity in win-rates is simply that the cases at each level are qualitatively diff erent. 
A signifi cant number of provincial-municipal confl icts are over zoning issues (33%), which constitute the most 
signifi cant plurality of cases. Th e constitutional issues are potentially atypical for these cases: although the 
municipal power to pass zoning laws is clearly delegated from the province’s power over “property and civil 
rights” (s.92(13)), the challenges often implicate provincial laws regarding land-use. It is possible that the large 
number of such cases might distort the results. To check that our results are not related to land-use claims, we 
separated them out and considered the frequencies. When zoning cases are removed, no other single issue area 
dominates, leaving a wide and varied fi eld of cases.
Among the 59 zoning cases, 42 have been upheld (71.2%). If zoning cases are removed from the data as in 
the chart above, 118 cases remain. Th e success rate for provincial cases, excluding zoning, is 79/118 (66.9%). Th e 
number of zoning cases upheld is nearly on par with the overall data (66.9% versus 68.4%). Th us, the zoning 
cases do not appear to dramatically infl ate the provincial win rate.
Th ere is a doctrinal distinction that may explain, at least theoretically, the win rate disparity but one that is 
not convincing in our reading of the jurisprudence: it is technically harder to challenge a bylaw as intruding on 
provincial jurisdiction because federal jurisdiction is protected “even if those powers have not been exercised” 
(MacLean and Tomlinson 2008, 69), whereas provincial jurisdiction may, or may not, require some degree of 
activity to be protected. While this additional protection might mean that federal jurisdiction is more secure 
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from municipal intrusions, we observed no judicial discussion of this feature in the cases. In other words, in 
no case did the success or failure of a challenge hinge solely on the grounds that the non-municipal level of 
government had (or had not) occupied the fi eld or not. Given the paucity of judicial commentary on this feature, 
we are skeptical that it plays any role in explaining the win rate disparity.
A related explanation may simply be that the federal Parliament has simply been more cautious in interfering 
with municipal matters. Lightbody (2006, 39) depicts the federal role in municipal aff airs as “cautious and 
diffi  cult” and Bakvis et al. (2009, 227) argue that the federal government “treads softly where municipal and local 
government authorities are involved.” Such an explanation runs counter to the impression that the federal level 
is playing an increasingly greater role. As Sancton (2011, 27-28) notes, the federal government has a number 
of tools to bypass the provincial power over municipalities. For example, the federal government has provided 
infrastructure, green energy, and homelessness prevention funding directly to the municipalities (McAllister 
2004, 119). A lack of constitutional formality has not precluded the federal government from intervening in 
municipal aff airs, especially on issues that are local in scope but have nation-wide consequences ( Jones 2012, 
1247). While the federal government lacks constitutional authority to implement standards through municipal 
funding, it has been signifi cantly involved in local aff airs (Stoney and Graham 2009, 374). For example, even 
though many aspects of housing fall directly under the provincial jurisdiction over “property and civil rights,” 
the federal government plays a major role in insuring home mortgages through the Canada Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation (Lightbody 2006, 366). Municipalities often welcome federal involvement in local 
aff airs to counteract provincial dominance. It has also been suggested that amalgamation places considerable 
pressure on municipalities, who turn to the federal government for solutions (Young and McCarthy 2009, 6). In 
short, despite concrete institutional and formal linkages, the federal-municipal relationship is broadening and 
deepening. It is thus diffi  cult to see disengagement as an explanation for the win-rate disparity, even if it helps 
us to understand the overall smaller set of federal-municipal cases compared to provincial ones.
It must be noted that the federal confl ict cases present more clearly “constitutional” issues.  By this we mean 
that the impugned bylaw runs contrary to an express statement of federal authority in s. 91 of the Constitution 
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Act, 1867. For instance, a Calgary bylaw that mandated the wearing of lifejackets on a waterway was challenged 
on the ground that it infringed the exclusive federal power over navigation in s. 91(10).11 Th e Alberta lower 
court ultimately ruled that the pith and substance of the bylaw was to promote the safety and welfare of the city’s 
residents involved in boating. Even though the bylaw regulated conduct that fell within the federal power over 
navigation and shipping, this “does not in itself mean that they are unconstitutional […] it is assumed that the 
Province and the City both are aware of and intend to conform to the limits of their constitutional authority.”12 
Th e three bylaws that were struck for confl icting with the federal navigation power were all in Quebec: one 
regulated the speed of crafts, 13 one prohibited the anchoring of boats,14 and one made boat ramps the exclusive 
jurisdiction of a municipality’s residents.15 Th ese were in pith and substance governing navigation and directly 
encroached the federal power. On these grounds, given the clear federal power over the postal service in s. 91(5), 
we estimated that the City of Hamilton had a less than 50% chance of succeeding with its action against Canada 
Post, but it can improve its odds if it can demonstrate that its bylaws complement, rather than contradict, the 
federal power to expropriate the land.  Hamilton did not do so, and its bylaw was ultimately found ultra vires.16 
Th e exclusive legislative power over criminal law is granted to the federal government under s. 91(27) but 
that has not stopped provinces and municipalities from enacting “quasi-criminal” provisions to deter misconduct 
(Baker 2014). A little under half of the federal cases involved challenges that municipalities had encroached on 
the federal criminal law power. Th is is not surprising since municipalities have a vested interest in preserving 
public order and safety. When behaviours that are already covered under the criminal law are duplicated in 
municipal form, law enforcement offi  cers can charge an off ender criminally or under the bylaw.  A municipal 
off ence relies on the balance of probabilities standard, compared to the “beyond a reasonable doubt” threshold 
required in federal criminal cases. Th is could mean that offi  cers who lack evidence for a criminal conviction 
could charge a less-onerous municipal violation instead.  Th is preference—and the resulting objection from 
the aggrieved off ender—may explain why ultra vires challenges to municipal bylaws on criminal grounds 
form the largest federal category. Provinces are, however, allowed to impose “Punishment by Fines, Penalty, or 
Imprisonment” to enforce any provincial laws that fall under s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.  If this power 
is validly delegated to municipalities, the municipal bylaw would possess statutory authorization to enact its 
“quasi-criminal” bylaws.
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While there are very few cases overall, the “criminal cases” refl ect the overall federal-municipal rate, with 4 
of the 9 bylaws surviving the challenge (3 of 5 adult entertainment bylaws, 1 of 2 casino bylaws and no successful 
public nudity bylaws).  In both of the public nudity cases, municipalities attempted to defi ne what was meant 
by “topless”. Th is was found to usurp the role of Parliament, which has exclusive jurisdiction in regulating public 
morals.17 Th e municipal bylaw amendment created a stricter standard than that imposed by the Criminal Code, 
and the lower court judge found this to be a “colourable attempt to regulate morality and thus displace the 
federal jurisdiction in respect of criminal law.”18 In another British Columbia case, the City of Surrey passed a 
bylaw preventing bathing “without being clothed in proper bathing attire.” Th e City justifi ed this bylaw on the 
grounds of public health, but it was found that the intent of the bylaw was to expand the defi nition of nudity 
beyond what was intended by Parliament, and was thus struck.19 
In the adult entertainment cases, where the municipal win rate was higher than average, bylaws were generally 
struck when they attempted to legislate morality but they were upheld if they took a form closer to a zoning 
bylaw. In multiple lower court cases in Ontario, bylaws that prescribed proper dress and legislated physical 
contact were struck because this was found to be an attempt to extend the criminal law prohibitions.20 In other 
lower court cases, bylaws that regulated types of touching and physical contact were ruled to be regulatory and a 
valid exercise of provincial authority.21 In a New Brunswick lower court, a bylaw prohibiting the use of property 
for adult entertainment was found to be intra vires because it was a valid exercise of the municipality’s zoning 
power and it was not legislating morality.22 An additional adult entertainment case challenged under provincial 
grounds was found by the Ontario Court of Appeal to be a valid provincial power.23 Th e court’s rationale here 
focused on the fact that the “mere existence of provincial legislation in a given fi eld does not oust the powers 
of a municipality to regulate a subject matter.”24 Baker (2014, 10) suggests that this case has set an important 
precedent for upholding similar challenges in other municipalities. Th us, a general trend appears for criminal 
law cases: when the bylaw attempts to defi ne proper conduct and regulate morality, courts are likely to strike 
down the bylaw for being in violation of federal jurisdiction. However, municipalities may have learned to 
frame the issue as a regulatory matter to achieve higher success rates. For instance, the public fi ghting bylaw in 
Edmonton was upheld because the Alberta Court of Appeal agreed that “in purpose and eff ect it regulates the 
conduct and activities of people in public places with a view to prompting the safe, enjoyable and reasonable use 
of property” [emphasis added].25
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Perhaps the disparity in win rates may be best understood as an artefact of the notion that municipal power 
is delegated by the province. When it comes to provincial confl ict cases, judges may be conscious of the fact 
that, as municipalities are “creatures of the province,” the provinces have the power to redress their jurisdictional 
defeat. Intrusions on the federal fi elds, however, are not as easily remedied, and could require the all-but-
impossible tool of constitutional amendment.  Provinces, on the other hand, can overturn their judicial loss 
through ordinary legislation that more clearly assigns the power to itself rather than the municipality.
In truth, the viability of a provincial response to a by-law battle may be more theoretical than actual. Practical 
considerations mean that provinces cannot simply trample over municipal interests. As Sancton (2009) has 
noted, while the statutory authority of the provincial legislature over the municipalities is seemingly unlimited, 
such statutes are broadly worded and delegate most of the regulatory power to Ministries, tribunals or other 
administrative actors. Th ese agents can only interfere with municipalities to the degree that legislation allows 
them to do so and more specifi c legislative direction for additional powers may be inhibited simply for being 
inconsistent with the broad grant of authority.
Our study suggests this phenomenon is, in fact, occurring. For the provincial confl ict cases, we considered 
whether the bylaw was enacted under a broad or specifi c grant of authority. A bylaw was coded as having a 
general grant by examining the legislation that the ultra vires challenge was based on: if it was a provincial 
Municipal Act, Local Government Act, Community Charter, or general act for a city (e.g. City of Toronto Act), 
it was classifi ed as a general grant. Otherwise, it was classifi ed as a specifi c grant (e.g. Tenant Protection Act, 
Motor Vehicle Act, Tobacco Control Act). Given that a broad grant provides more leeway for municipalities to craft 
their legislation, we suspected that those bylaws would be more likely to be upheld.  Of the 176 cases where it 
could be determined if the grant of authority was broad or specifi c (excluding 4 cases that were both), 115 cases 
involved a broad grant as compared to 61 involving a specifi c grant. Th e survival rate for the bylaws was higher 
under broad grants of authority (82 upheld, 71.3%) compared to specifi c grants (38 upheld, 62.3%).  While the 
diff erence in win rates is not dramatic, the “broad grants” rate is higher than the overall win rate against the 
province and the “specifi c grant” number is lower, suggesting that the nature of the grant might play some role. 
In short, the judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the lower court trial judges, appear to be giving 
some legal vitality to the broad grants of authority from the province and, if this trend continues, it could result 
in a new appraisal of the constitutional role of municipalities. Th e disproportionate win rate of municipal bylaws 
against provincial power (compared to the federal confl icts) suggests a sort of jurisprudential jujitsu: using the 
formal constitutional weakness of the municipalities as an informal strength. While it remains formally open to 
the province to carve out specifi c exceptions in the form of new statutory provisions, such an approach would 
plainly contradict the spirit of the broad grant and its presumption of municipal autonomy. In this way, the 
provincial ability to answer a by-law battle with new legislation resembles the notwithstanding clause (section 
33) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: it allows for a potential response to a judicial outcome, but one that is 
often practically unavailable. If this is the case, then the municipalities, in some real and practical sense, have a 
greater constitutional status than we might expect from “mere delegates” of provincial power. While remaining 
formally subject to provincial whim, the support of the judiciary in upholding their by-laws against claims of 
provincial jurisdiction means that the informal power of municipalities is quite strong. While we would not say 
it is a third constitutional level of government, we suggest it might be considered “2.5.”   
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Notes
1   R.S.C., 1985, c. C-10, s.19(k).
2   Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria c.3 (U.K.), s.91(5).  
3   Canada Post v. City of Hamilton, 2015 ONSC 3615 (CanLII).
4   Croplife Canada v. Toronto (City), 75 O.R. (3d) 357 (ON C.A., 2005) at para. 17.
5   Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society,  2011 SCC 44 at para. 19
6     Of the bylaw illegalities, the Digest groups these into the following categories: “excess of territorial jurisdiction,” 
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“excess of jurisdiction over property and persons,” “confl ict with provincial statutes,” and “unconstitutionality.” 
Th ese three categories will be treated as a provincial encroachment for the purposes of this paper because all 
three relate to council exceeding the powers given to it by the provincial legislature. A closer look at these three 
encroachment types helps to clarify this. For “excess of territorial jurisdiction,” each municipality is delineated 
by boundaries that are set by the province. It may only exercise its powers within its own territory, with limited 
exceptions. For example, Ontario’s Municipal Act notes that “By-laws and resolutions of a municipality apply 
only within its boundaries.” A municipality in Ontario may exceed its boundaries if a neighbouring municipality 
or local body provides consent. By default, councils are banned from exercising powers outside their boundaries 
unless the legislature has expressly allowed this; if they attempt to do so, the bylaw is ultra vires. For “excess of 
jurisdiction over property and persons,” the bylaw is ultra vires if it regulates persons who do not fall within 
the enabling legislation. Th e fi nal type of provincial encroachment consists of “confl ict with provincial statutes.” 
Bylaws are ultra vires if they are “inconsistent with or in confl ict with the provisions of a provincial enactment or 
if they infringe upon a right conferred by a provincial statute,” and bylaws are always subordinate to provincial 
legislation.
7   Franki Elliott, Senior Reference Consultant, Carswell, e-mail message to fi rst author, January 27, 2014.
8   Th e excluded categories are: 
Attacks on By-Laws And Resolutions – Grounds – Ultra Vires – Beyond Power of Municipality – Indirect Taxation
Municipal law – Municipal contracts – Ultra vires contracts – General 
Municipal law – Municipal contracts – Ultra vires contracts
Municipal law – Municipal contracts – Estoppel – Ultra vires contracts
Municipal law – Municipal fi nance – Expenditures – Ultra vires expenditures – Statutory authority
Municipal law – Municipal fi nance – Expenditures – Ultra vires expenditures – Demonstrated need
Municipal Law – Municipal fi nance – Expenditures – Ultra vires expenditures – Gratuitous payments to mu-
nicipal offi  cers
9   Cases were omitted when the highest appellate decision neglected the ultra vires issue entirely. If the highest 
appellate decision commented on the substance of the ultra vires challenge, the case was included in the analysis.
10   In 5 cases, an ultra vires claim was made on both federal and provincial grounds.
11   R. v. Latouche, 2010 ABPC 166
12   Ibid. at para. 106
13   McLeod c. St-Sauveur (Ville), [2005] R.J.Q. 1511.
14   La Rochelle c. Austin (Municipalité), J.E. 2004-295, REJB 2003-51811. 
15   Chalets St-Adolphe inc. c. St-Aldophe d’Howard (Municipalité), 2011 QCCA 1491.
16   Canada Post v. City of Hamilton, 2015 ONSC 3615 (CanLII).
17   Maple Ridge (District) v. Meyer, 2000 BCSC 902. 
18   Ibid. at para. 59.
19   Skinnydipper Services Inc. v. Surrey (City), 2007 BCSC 1625 at para. 27-28.
20   Pimenova v. Brampton (City), 49 M.P.L.R. (3d) 1 (ON, 2004); Tsui v. Vaughan (City), 2013 ONCJ 643. 
21   Ontario Adult Entertainment Bar Assn. v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality), 35 O.R. (3d) 161 (ON C.A., 
1997); Mississauga (City) v. Th eofi laktidis, 2004 ONCJ 427; 563080 Alberta Ltd. v. Calgary (City), 38 M.P.L.R. 
(2d) 54 (AB C.Q.B., 1997).
22   613742 N.B. Inc. v. Moncton (City), 2009 NBQB 16.
23   Adult Entertainment Assn. of Canada v. Ottawa (City), 2007 ONCA 389.
24   Ibid. at para. 71.
25   R. v. Keshane, 2012 ABCA 330 at para. 39.
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